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1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v,
Case No. 950230-CA
Priority No. 2

DALE RYAN MCGRATH,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994).

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in its determination

that the statements of codefendant David Ricks were sufficiently
attenuated from the illegal stop and seizure of McGrath and Ricks
to be admissible at trial?
Standard of review. Factual findings underlying a motion
to suppress are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.

The

trial court's conclusions of law based thereon are reviewed for
correctness.

State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-5 (Utah 1992) .

Preserved below by pretrial motion to suppress, R. 33-7,
and conditional guilty plea, R. 70-77 (plea affidavit) , 181-9 (plea
colloquy).

2.

Whether Mr. Ricks' testimony is admissible under the

inevitable discovery doctrine of Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
448, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2511, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 390 (1984)?
Standard of Review.

See standard above.

Preserved below by pretrial motion to suppress, R. 33-7,
and conditional guilty plea, R. 70-77 (plea affidavit), 181-9 (plea
colloquy).

3•
test

Whether this Court should adopt a more stringent

for attenuation under the Utah Constitution

witness context?

2

in the

live

Standard of review.
for correctness.

This is a question of law reviewed

State v. Mohi, 267 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 8 (Utah

1995).
Preserved below at R. 163.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Mr. McGrath was charged by information dated April 20,
1993

with

two

counts

of

aggravated

robbery

(with

firearm

enhancements) in case No. 931900519. Mr. McGrath filed a motion to
suppress which was heard (transcript, R. 190-269) and granted (R.
245-7, 257-8).

The trial court originally ruled that statements of

co-defendant David Anthony Ricks (case
suppressed.

R. 258, 265.

931900518) must likewise be

The State dismissed the charges without

prejudice.
The State refiled by information dated September 24,
1993.

R. 6-8.

The case was transferred to Judge Moffat.

R. 30.

Mr. McGrath filed a motion to suppress (R. 33-7) which was heard on
March 15, 1994 (transcript, R. 103-180) and denied.

R. 175-6 (oral

ruling), 56-62 (findings and conclusions, attached as Addendum A) .
The Supreme Court denied interlocutory review.

R. 64.

Mr. McGrath entered a conditional guilty plea to two
counts of robbery reserving his right to appeal the denial of his
motion

to

colloquy).

suppress.

R.

70-77

(plea

affidavit),

181-9

Mr. McGrath was sentenced to concurrent

(plea

statutory

terms, stayed pending satisfactory completion of probation. R. 823.

This appeal ensued.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 1:00 A.M. on March 22, 1993, a masked,
armed man robbed the clerk of a Maverick Country Store located at
5390 S. 5600 W. , netting $130.

At approximately 3:15 A.M., a

masked, armed man robbed the clerk of a 7-Eleven store at 6398
South Highland Drive.

R. 7, 196-99.

Sergeant Jack Dwyer, at the

time the east patrol supervisor for the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
office (R. 195), proceeded to the 7-Eleven location and interviewed
the clerk.

R. 199. The clerk indicated that he saw an older model

full size white pickup speed northbound on Highland within a minute
or so after the robbery.

R. 7, 200-1.

There was no information

concerning plate number, year, or make of the vehicle.

R. 209.

There was no other connection between the white pickup and the
robbery other than temporal proximity in that location.

R. 220.

At 4:49 A.M., Officer Dwyer observed an older model white
pickup just west of 39th South and Highland.

R. 202. Officer Dwyer

thought there was the possibility of a speed violation, but "didn't
clock him long enough."

R. 206.

Officer Dwyer estimated the

vehicle's speed at between 40 and 50 MPH in a 40 MPH zone, but did
not feel comfortable writing a ticket.
initiated a traffic stop.
the traffic
dragging.

R. 204.

R. 223.

Officer Dwyer

At the same time he initiated

stop, the officer noticed that the tail pipe was

R. 227, 245.
Co-defendant David Ricks confessed after his arrest, and

on April 22nd, 1993, pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement.

Mr.

Ricks pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary in exchange
4

for dismissal of the remaining aggravated burglary count and four
second degree felony counts in case No. 931900240 stemming from a
residential burglary and theft of property valued in excess of
$6,000,

including

two firearms.

Mr. Ricks

testify against Mr. McGrath in this case.

further agreed

to

See R. 109, 141-2, 150,

248-9, 254-7; pleadings from Mr. Ricks' criminal cases (attached as
addendum B ) .

In exchange for Mr. Ricks' cooperation, he received

a probationary sentence after a 90 day diagnostic evaluation.

R.

151-4.
The trial court granted Mr. McGrath's initial motion to
suppress on June 9th, 1993, finding that Officer Dwyer did not have
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Mr. McGrath's vehicle. R.
245-7, 257-8.
After the case was refiled, Mr. McGrath filed a new
motion to suppress the fruits of the bad stop, asserting that the
evidence the State sought to use was tainted by the bad stop.
33-7.

At

the

hearing

the

State

called

Marjorie

R.

McGrath,

appellant's mother, who testified that Detective Glover left a card
in her door, and she returned his call.

R. 118.

Mrs. McGrath

recalled the night of the illegal stop and Dale's arrest, and
recalled that Dale had been with Mr. Ricks earlier that evening.
R. 119-20.

Prior to that evening, Mrs. McGrath had only met Mr.

Ricks once before.
125.

R. 115.

She had not seen him since.

R. 121,

With reference to the robberies, she testified:
Q
Did your son ever indicate to you how it
came to be that Mr. Ricks was in jail?
A
Well, yeah, he was part of the robbery.
I knew that.
5

Q
Okay. Did your son ever indicate to you
that he was part of the robbery?
A
Yes. He told me that he was in the truck,
he was driving the truck.
Q
Did he ever indicate to you whether or not
a weapon was used?
A
He said that they'd been accused of it,
but I had never seen a weapon.
Q
Okay.
A
My son, as far as -- to my knowledge,
never owned a gun.
Q
Did he indicate to you whether any money
was received by anybody who participated in this robbery?
A
He said that Rick[s] had given him -- Dave
had given him $10 for gas.
R. 121-2.

On cross:

Q
And when he said he was driving the truck,
did he indicate whether or not he knew that David was
robbing the stores, while he was driving the truck?
A
What he told me was, he was taking Dave
around trying to find him a place to stay for the night,
because when he had him at my house, he -- David asked
Dale to see if he could spend the night at my home, and
I told him no. And so this is what I was told, that he
was taking him someplace to find a place to stay for the
night.
Q
So, Dale didn't indicate that he knew that
Dave was robbing the stores while he was driving?
A
No. He didn't say anything to me.
R. 125-6.x
Detective James L. Glover testified that on September 9,
1993 Officer Dwyer informed him of the white pickup and its license
plate

number.

Detective

Glover

ran a computer

check

registration and learned it was registered to Mr. McGrath.
13 0.

on

the

R. 128-

On that day he left a card at the McGrath residence.

Mrs.

McGrath returned his call on the 10th, and informed Detective Glover
x

Mrs. McGrath's testimony is only a minor focus of Mr.
McGrath's suppression motion.
Her testimony is at worst only
mildly incriminating -- there is no indication that Dale McGrath
was aware the robberies were occurring and was a willing
participant in them.
6

that Dale no longer lived there and no longer owned the vehicle.
She related that the night before Dale's arrest, he and David Ricks
left her home together in the white pickup.
to have Dale call him.
Dale called
Glover.

R. 130.

He asked Mrs. McGrath

R. 13 0.
later that day and spoke with Detective

Detective Glover testified:

Q

And what did you ask him and what did he

say?
A
Well, I told him to contact his attorney-because he didn't want to be booked again--and make
arrangements so that he wouldn't have to be booked,
because we were going to file again. And I asked him to
meet with me, but he said that he was too ill to--to meet
with me, and so he didn't meet with me, we talked a
little bit about the robberies, and he says-- he told me
that the only money that he got from the whole situation
was $10 or--which he was given, at Denny's, between the
two robberies.
Q
Okay.
Was there any more of the
conversation that you can recall?
A
No.
R. 132.

On cross:

Q
That one of the things he said to you was
that the only money he got was $10 that he received from
Mr. Ricks between the two robberies?
A
That's correct.
Q
Is that right? Did he expand upon that,
or explain that statement in any way?
A
No. He didn't want--he appeared not to
want to talk to me and--and that was it and didn't-Q
And he didn't indicate to you whether or
not at the time he received the money, he knew that it
was the proceeds of a robbery, did he?
A
No. That's all he told me; he said--he
said there was $10 between the two robberies. That's
all.
R. 136.2
2

These statements to Detective Glover likewise do not indicate
that Mr. McGrath was aware that Mr. Ricks was committing armed
robberies. Rather, they indicate a lay persons view that the $10
Mr. Ricks gave to Mr. McGrath could not be kept by Mr. McGrath if
7

Mr. McGrath7s motion to suppress was mainly focused on
the testimony of David Ricks, the armed robber and codefendant.

He

testified that he and Mr. McGrath discussed the robberies before
Mr. Ricks committed them.

He testified the gun Mr. Ricks used in

the robberies belonged to Mr. McGrath.

R. 143.

Mr. Ricks further

testified that Mr. McGrath signaled to him in court to give him a
call.

In that later conversation, Mr. McGrath asked Mr. Ricks to

"take the rap for him."
The

trial

R. 147-8.
court

entered

detailed

findings

and

conclusions, and refused to suppress the testimony of Mr. Ricks,
Mrs. McGrath, or Mr. McGrath's statements to Detective Glover.

R.

56-62.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under the attenuation standards set forth in Ceccolini,
the

testimony

suppressed.

of

codefendant

David

Ricks

should

have

been

The police only learned of Mr. Ricks' existence as a

result of an illegal traffic stop.

His cooperation and testimony

is the result of direct exploitation of that bad stop.

Had he not

been stopped and found in possession of the robbery proceeds, he
would never have come forward.

Police contact with Mr. Ricks after

the stop was immediate, and the passage of time has not purged the
taint.

Finally, the purpose of the illegal traffic stop was to

obtain evidence of the robberies at issue.
suppressed.
it were the proceeds of a robbery.
8

The testimony must be

Mr.
discovered.

Ricks' testimony would

not have been

Mr. Ricks only cooperated

inevitably

and agreed to

testify

because of the illegal traffic stop resulting in his being caught
with the robbery proceeds.

Absent that nexus, there was nothing

tying him to the robberies and for reasons of pure self interest he
would not reveal his knowledge.
motivation.

Mr. Ricks had no independent

The inevitable discovery doctrine does not establish

an independent basis for admitting his testimony.
Under article I, section 14, this Court should reject
Ceccolini and apply the same attenuation analysis to live witness
testimony as is applied to physical evidence.

Ceccolini muddies

the

source

distinctions

between

the

independent

doctrine,

inevitable discovery doctrine, and attenuation doctrine.

This

Court should also clarify that temporal proximity is only relevant
to the extent that something occurs during that time to dissipate
the taint of the prior illegality.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TESTIMONY OF DAVID RICKS AND THE
OTHER WITNESSES SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED AS
UNATTENUATED FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.
The exclusionary rule applies to exclude the evidentiary
fruits of fourth amendment violations committed by the police.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652
(1914).

The Supreme Court made clear in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.

United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920) that
no derivative use was to be made of illegally seized evidence.
9

"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not
be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all."
Id. at 392.
Despite
admissible

if

the

it

is

initial

illegality,

sufficiently

attenuated

evidence
from

the

may

be

illegal

conduct to purge the taint, see Nardone v. United States, 3 08 U.S.
338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 268, 84 L.Ed. 307, 312 (1939); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
The evidence here lacks sufficient attenuation to purge the taint
of the illegal stop.

A.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS.

In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45
L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), the Supreme Court set forth the factors to be
considered

in

exploitation

analyzing

whether

of prior police

evidence

illegality,

is

obtained

including:

by

temporal

proximity, presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and
especially the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.
Id. at 603-4.
1992);

See also State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300-01 (Utah

State v. Arroyo,

796

P.2d

684, 690-1 n.4

(Utah

1990)

(recognizing Brown factors in search consent context), State v.
Thurman, 846 P. 2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993) (directing courts to apply
Brown factors in search consent context).
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054,
55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978) is the leading Supreme Court case on whether
10

live witness testimony is sufficiently attenuated from an illegal
search or seizure to be admissible.

In Ceccolini, a uniformed

police officer named Biro, while on a break, went to visit an
acquaintance named Lois Hennessey at the flower shop at which she
worked.

While there, he noticed an envelope with money sticking

out of it lying on the drawer of the cash register behind the
counter.

Upon

examining

the

contents

of

the

envelope,

discovered it contained policy slips used for taking bets.

he

Officer

Biro replaced the envelope and asked Hennessey to whom it belonged.
She indicated that Ceccolini was the owner.
the

information he had discovered

relayed the information to the FBI.

Officer Biro relayed

to detectives, who

in turn

Id., 435 U.S. at 269-70.

Prior to Officer Biro's visit, the flower shop had been
under

surveillance

pursuant

to

an

investigation

of

suspected

gambling operations, because Francis Millow, a suspect
probe,

regularly

visited

the

shop.

Surveillance

in the

had

been

discontinued a year prior to Officer Biro's visit and discovery.
Four months
Hennessey.

after Biro's

discovery,

an FBI

agent

interviewed

She indicated her willingness to assist the officers.

Ceccolini was subsequently summoned before a grand jury, and denied
that he had taken bets from Millow.
contrary.

Hennessey testified to the

Ceccolini was indicted for perjury, and convicted based

on Hennessey's testimony.

Id., 435 U.S. at 271-2.

The Supreme Court declined to adopt a per se rule that
testimony of a live witness should never be excluded.

11

Ceccolini,

435 U.S. 274. The Supreme Court began its inquiry by examining the
degree of free will exercised by the witness:
The greater the willingness of the witness to
freely testify, the greater the likelihood that he or she
will be discovered by legal means and, concomitantly, the
smaller the incentive to conduct an illegal search to
discover the witness.4 Witnesses are not like guns or
4

0f
course,
the
analysis
might
be
different where the search was conducted by the
police for the specific purpose of discovering
potential witnesses.
documents which remain hidden from view until one turns
over a sofa or opens a filing cabinet. Witnesses can,
and often do, come forward and offer evidence entirely of
their own volition. And evaluated properly, the degree
of free will necessary to dissipate the taint will very
likely be found more often in the case of live-witness
testimony than other kinds of evidence. The time, place
and manner of the initial questioning of the witness may
be such that any statements are truly the product of
detached reflection and a desire to be cooperative on the
part of the witness. And the illegality which led to the
discovery of the witness very often will not play any
meaningful part in the witness' willingness to testify.
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276-7.
The

Supreme

Court

drew

careful

distinctions

between

cases, such as Ceccolini, where the witness is not a putative
defendant, and those cases, such as the case now before this Court,
where the witness is a defendant.
[A] t least in a case such as this, where not only was the
alleged "fruit of the poisonous tree" the testimony of a
live witness, but unlike Wong Sun the witness was not a
putative defendant, an examination of our cases persuades
us that the Court of Appeals was simply wrong in
concluding that if the road were uninterrupted, its
length was immaterial.
Id., 435 U.S. at 275.
[T] he degree of free will exercised by the witness is not
irrelevant in determining the extent to which the basic
purpose of the exclusionary rule will be advanced by its
application. This is certainly true when the challenged
12

statements are made by a putative defendant after arrest,
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491, 83 S.Ct.
407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), and a
fortiori is true of testimony given by nondefendants.
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276.
After discussing the high institutional costs associated
with preventing a witness from testifying, the Court held that a
closer link between the illegality and the testimony sought to be
excluded is required than for exclusion of physical evidence.

Id. ,

435 U.S. 278. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94
S.Ct. 613,

, 38 L.Ed. 2d 561, 571

(1974)

("Despite its broad

deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted
to

proscribe

the

use

of

illegally

proceedings or against all persons.

seized

evidence

in

all

As with any remedial device,

the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas
where

its

remedial

objectives

are

thought

most

efficaciously

served.").
Applying attenuation analysis to the facts of the case,
the Court concluded:
[W] e hold that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
the degree of attenuation was not sufficient to dissipate
the connection between the illegality and the testimony.
The evidence indicates overwhelming that the testimony
given by the witness was an act of her own free will in
no way coerced or even induced by official authority as
a result of Biro's discovery of the policy slips. Nor
were the slips themselves used in questioning Hennessey.
Substantial periods of time elapsed between the time of
the illegal search and the initial contact with the
witness, on the one hand, and between the latter and the
testimony at trial on the other. While the particular
knowledge to which Hennessey testified at trial can be
logically traced back to Biro's discovery of the policy
slips,
both
the
identity
of Hennessey
and her
relationship with the respondent were well known to those
13

investigating the case. There is, in addition not the
slightest evidence to suggest that Biro entered the shop
or picked up the envelope with the intent of finding
tangible evidence bearing on an illicit gambling
operation, much less any suggestion that he entered the
shop and searched with the intent of finding a willing
and knowledgeable witness to testify against respondent.
Application of the exclusionary rule in this situation
could not have the slightest deterrent effect on the .
behavior of an officer such as Biro.
The cost of
permanently silencing Hennessey is too great for an
evenhanded system of law enforcement to bear in order to
secure such a speculative and very likely negligible
deterrent effect.
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279-80.
In United States v. Cruz, 581 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1978),
the en banc

Fifth Circuit applied Ceccolini to the situation here,

where a putative codefendant is discovered by means of an illegal
search or seizure.

In Cruz, a part time deputy sheriff made an

illegal pretext stop of a vehicle 25 miles from the Mexican border
to search for illegal aliens. The defendant was transporting three
illegal aliens.

Based on the testimony of two of these three at

trial, Cruz was convicted of conspiracy to transport illegal aliens
and three counts of transporting illegal aliens.
42.

The en banc

581 F.2d at 539-

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

The Fifth Circuit characterized Ceccolini as establishing
a three part test:3
3

0ther courts consider Ceccolini to have established a four
part balancing test addressing: (1) the willingness of the witness
to testify; (2) the role played by the illegally seized evidence in
obtaining cooperation of the witness; (3) the temporal proximity
between the illegality, the decision to cooperate, and testimony at
trial; and (4) the police motivation in engaging in the illegal
behavior. See United States v. Leonard!, 623 F.2d 746, 752 (2nd
Cir.), cert, denied, 447 U.S. 928, 100 S. Ct. 3027, 65 L.Ed.2d 1123
(1980) ; United States v. Hooten, 662 F.2d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 1981) ,
cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1004, 102 S.Ct. 1640, 71 L.Ed.2d 873 (1982);
14

(1) Directness: how direct was the relationship between
the search and the ultimate testimony?; (2) Attenuation:
is the causal relationship weakened by facts showing that
the witness's voluntary detached reflection and other
circumstances occurring after the search played a
significant part in inducing the witness to testify; (3)
Inhibitory Effect: would exclusion of the testimony tend
to deter unconstitutional police misconduct?
Cruz, 581 F.2d at 543.

Applying this test to the facts of the

case, the Fifth Circuit reversed:
Here, each test points to the same result; all
weights must be placed on the "suppress" side of the
balance. The witnesses were initially questioned at the
very scene of arrest and detained only as a result of the
illegal stop. They were detained until the trial, and
their testimony can hardly be said to be either voluntary
or the result of detached reflection.
They were
discovered as a result of a search having no purpose
other than their discovery and apprehension. Finally,
the exclusion of their testimony is likely to deter such
searches in the future. The Ceccolini analysis commands
the exclusion of the testimony indispensable to the
conviction.
Id.

See also United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392 (9th

Cir. 1989) (similar case where testimony of illegal aliens in van
held unattenuated from illegal search).
The en

banc

D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reached a

similar result in suppressing the testimony of a state's witness in
United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d 956 (D.C.Cir. 1978).
arrested

pursuant

pharmacy.
Scios's

to

a warrant

for

illegal

Scios was

wiretapping

of

a

At the time of his arrest, an FBI agent riffled through

business

files

wiretapped pharmacy.

and

removed

a

file pertaining

to

the

A motel receipt in that file indicated that

State v. Bravo, 762 P.2d 1318, 1327 (Ariz. 1988), cert, denied, 490
U.S. 1039, 109 S.Ct. 1942, 104 L.Ed.2d 413 (1989). Appellant will
utilize this four part approach in this brief.
15

a "Mr. Massa" had registered for the room. Massa was located and
reluctantly testified against Scios at trial.
The en banc

590 F.2d at 961.

D.C. Circuit reversed:

The case at bar stands in marked contrast to
Ceccolini on these critical factors: (1) In Ceccolini,
Hennessey's testimony "was an acto of her own free will
in no way coerced or even induced by official authority."
In contrast, Massa initially refused to consult with the
authorities, and agreed to confer and to testify only in
response to pressure by the prosecutor, including the
threat of a contempt citation.
(2) Massa's existence as a potential witness
was entirely unknown to the authorities before they
searched Scios's files.
(3) The search of Scios's files was to gain
evidence, the FBI having come to the scene to arrest
Scios for illegal wiretapping.
Excluding the fruit of that illegal search
cannot be dismissed as of "negligible deterrent effect."
*

*

*

*

*

*

We conclude, in sum, that the taint of the
illegal search and seizure of the folder was not
dissipated . . .
Scios, 590 F.2d at 963 (footnote omitted).
State v. Bravo, 762 P.2d 1318 (Ariz. 1988), cert, denied,
490 U.S. 1039, 109 S.Ct. 1942, 104 L.Ed.2d 413
discovery of a putative defendant

(1989), concerns

from statements

defendant asserted his Miranda rights.

taken after

The court found that the

testimony of the witness, a co-participant in the robbery with
which Bravo was charged, should have been excluded.
Analyzing the facts under the Ceccolini factors, the
court found the purpose of the Miranda violation was to obtain
evidence.

762 P. 2d at 1327-8.

The court also found the time lapse

factor cut in favor of exclusion.

The police located the witness

immediately, and cut a deal with him.

The subsequent time lapse

prior to trial was irrelevant, as the witness was in no position to
16

back out of his deal.

762 P. 2d at 1328-9.

The link between the

illegal confession and the testimony of the witness was direct.
Prior to Bravo's admissions, the police "didn't have a clue" that
the witness existed or had helpful testimony.

762 P.2d at 1329.

With respect to the voluntariness of the witness, the court noted
that

the

witness

had

no

options.

He

was

confronted

with

accusations, and informed that charges would not be filed if he
cooperated.

Bravo, 762 P. 2d at 1329-30.

The testimony of the

witness was suppressed.

B.

THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE REQUIRE
SUPPRESSION.
1.

Mr. Ricks was not a willing witness;
rather he was faced with no other
realistic option.

Mr. Ricks was not a willing citizen witness.

Compare

Ceccolini (citizen witness testimony properly admissible); United
States v. Wvler, 502 F.Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (victim witness
testimony

properly

admissible).

Rather,

he

was

a

putative

defendant caught with the proceeds of two armed robberies.

Like

the defendant in Bravo, Mr. Ricks was presented with no reasonable
options.
Mr. Ricks made the best of a bad situation, and cut the
best deal he could.

He pled guilty to one first degree felony

aggravated robbery charge with the State agreeing to drop the
firearm enhancement, in exchange for dismissal of an identical
charge (including firearm enhancement) , dismissal of four second
degree felony charges stemming from a residential burglary, and the
17

State's

recommendation

receive probation.
witness.

for probation.

See Addendum B.

Mr. Ricks

in

fact did

Mr. Ricks was not a willing

He would not have come forward of his own accord and said

to the world, "I committed two armed robberies.
citizen I want to tell you all about it.

I'm such a good

Please send me to prison.

P.S. Don't forget to include the firearm enhancements."

In State

v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah 1981), the court stated that for
evidence to be admissible under Ceccolini, the witness must have a
motivation to testify independent of the police illegality.
Mr. Ricks had no such independent motivation.

Here,

This factor cuts in

favor of suppression.

2.

Mr. Ricks' willingness to testify
was coerced by direct exploitation
of the knowledge the police obtained
by the unlawful traffic stop.

Had Mr. Ricks been approached out of the blue and asked
if he knew anything about any armed robberies, his likely response
would have been the usual
about."

"I don't know what you are talking

Mr. Ricks' cooperation was obtained by direct exploitation

of the fruits of the illegal traffic stop.
robbery proceeds.

He was caught with

Like the witnesses in Scios, Cruz, Bravo, and

Ramirez-Sandoval, Mr. Ricks' connection to the robberies here was
completely unknown to the police.
illegal

traffic

exploited
assistance

during

stop revealed
subsequent

in testifying

The information obtained in the

his

identity,

questioning

to

and was used
obtain

against Mr. McGrath.

States v. Stevens, 612 F.2d 1226, 1229
18

and

Mr. Ricks'

Compare United

(10th Cir. 1979), cert.

denied, 447 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct.
(testimony

properly

admissible

3011, 65 L.Ed.2d
where

authorities

1113

(1980)

had

prior

knowledge of witness and evidence against him).
The testimony of a live witness may be so attenuated from
the taint of evidence obtained by the illegal search that
the evidence is not the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
[] But for such evidence to be admissible, despite its
connection with the illegally obtained evidence, it must
spring basically from an independent motivation by the
witness to make the disclosure.
State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 702 (Utah 1981) .

Here, Mr. Ricks

had no independent motivation. His testimony derives directly from
exploitation of the knowledge gained in the course of the illegal
traffic stop.

This factor favors suppression.

3.

There was no time lapse between the
illegal stop and the use of the
illegally obtained evidence
and
knowledge in questioning Mr. Ricks.

Mr. Ricks was questioned shortly after his arrest.
150.

R.

There was no significant time lapse between the illegal stop

and police efforts at making Mr. Ricks a witness against Mr.
McGrath.

While Mr. McGrath's case was originally dismissed after

the trial court granted his motion to suppress, all time delays
occasioned

thereby are strictly attributable

should play no role in attenuation analysis.

to the State and
Mr. McGrath's case

was set for trial on Monday, June 21st, 1993, only three months
after the illegal stop.

R. 261, 263.

Mr. Ricks was continuously incarcerated from the time of
the stop until released on probation pursuant to his agreement to
testify against Mr. McGrath on the day after Thanksgiving, 1993.
19

There was no time period for Mr. Ricks to consider his options free
from the taint of the illegal stop and the coercive atmosphere of
his subsequent detention.

Nothing occurred during any time period

to dissipate the taint of the illegal traffic stop.

This factor

favors suppression.

4.

The purpose of the illegal traffic
stop was to obtain evidence of the
robberies in question.

In Brown, the Supreme Court indicated that the purpose
and flagrancy of the police illegality was the most important of
the factors to be considered in attenuation analysis.
603-4.

422 U.S. at

The Court again stressed this factor in Ceccolini:

The penalties visited upon the Government, and in turn
upon the public, because its officers have violated the
law must bear some relation to the purposes which the law
is to serve.
435 U.S. at 279.

This most important factor argues strongly for

suppression here.

The purpose of Officer Dwyer's stop of Mr.

McGrath's vehicle was to investigate the prior robberies. The stop
identified

the

prime

suspects,

uncovered

evidence

of

those

robberies, and led to conviction of Mr. Ricks as well as the
conviction currently before this Court.

Officer Dwyer's stop of

Mr. McGrath was purposeful and flagrant. As in Cruz, Scios, Bravo,
and Ramirez-Sandoval, this is a case where suppression would have
maximum deterrent effect and be most beneficial.
Under the analysis set forth in Ceccolini, suppression
here is warranted and required.

20

POINT II. MR. RICKS' TESTIMONY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
INEVITABLY DISCOVERED, AND IS NOT ADMISSIBLE
ON THAT BASIS.
The State argued inevitable discovery at Mr. McGrath's
original motion to suppress, R. 249-254, but the trial court agreed
that there was no evidence on that point.

R. 256. The State again

argued inevitable discovery at the second motion to suppress.

R.

156-7.
Under Nix v. Williams, evidence is admissible if the
prosecution proves that the evidence would inevitably have been
discovered.
follows:

The State's theory of inevitable discovery is as

(1) there was no wrongdoing in obtaining Mr. McGrath's

license plate number; (2) a check of motor vehicle records leads to
Mr. McGrath;

(3) the police would have consulted with Dale's

mother; (4) she would have remembered that Dale was out with David
Ricks that night; and finally

(5) when police contacted David

Ricks, he would have confessed, implicated Mr. McGrath, and agreed
to testify at trial.
The State's

theory

is premised

on pure

speculation.

There is nothing in the record to indicate that, absent the illegal
traffic stop, Mr. Ricks would have cooperated with the police.
While the police may have discovered that Mr. Ricks was with Mr.
McGrath the night of these robberies, that information is not
critical.
What is critical is evidence tying either or both to the
robberies.
concerning

The
an

trial
older

court
model,

correctly
full
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found

size,

that

white

information
pickup

was

insufficient.

The only additional information the police had was

obtained at the illegal stop.
Absent

being

apprehended

in

possession

of

robbery

proceeds, Mr. Ricks' own self interest would require that he not
divulge anything about the crimes he had just committed.
had no independent motivation to implicate himself

Mr. Ricks
in serious

felonies.
The State presented evidence concerning Mr. McGrath's
license plate, and follow-ups leading to Mrs. McGrath's statement
that Mr. McGrath was with Mr. Ricks the evening of the robberies.
The State wholly failed, however, to present any evidence that Mr.
Ricks would have assisted the police absent the illegal traffic
stop.

See Mr. Ricks' testimony, R. 139-154.

Because it was the

State's burden to present such evidence, see Williams, the State's
inevitable discovery argument must fail.

State v. Northrup, 756

P.2d 1288, 1295 (UtahApp. 1988) ("Absent sufficient particularized
evidence of 'inevitable discovery,' we cannot speculate on unknown
possibilities.").
would

inevitably

The State had failed to prove that Mr. Ricks
come

forward

and

implicated

himself

and Mr.

McGrath in the aggravated robberies.
The inevitable discovery doctrine is unavailing to make
Mr. Ricks' testimony admissible.

POINT III. UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION, THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT A MORE
STRINGENT TEST FOR ATTENUATION FOR LIVE
WITNESS TESTIMONY.

22

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the
state constitution may be interpreted differently than the federal
constitution.

E.g., State v. Hvqh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-3 (Utah 1985)

(Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221
n.8

(Utah

1988);

State v.

Larocco,

794

P.2d

460

(Utah

1990)

(rejecting federal automobile exception to warrant requirement);
Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P. 2d 734

(Utah 1991)

(extending

state due process protections to original parole hearings).

The

separate analysis in Ceccolini applied by the Supreme Court to
attenuation analysis for live witness testimony is unwarranted and
makes this area of law unnecessarily complex.

This Court should

reject Ceccolini, and apply the same attenuation analysis to live
witness testimony as is used for physical evidence.
In

Ceccolini,

Justice

Marshall4

wrote

a

very

well-

reasoned dissent questioning why any distinctions should be drawn
between live testimony and physical evidence.

435 U.S. at 285-90.

Justice Marshall notes that the differences between these types of
evidence

have

already been accommodated

by

existing doctrine.

While true that live witnesses can and do come forward, this fact
is soundly rooted and protected in the independent source doctrine,
see Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40
S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed.2d 319

(1920), and the inevitable discovery

rule, see Williams. Where witnesses in fact do come forward, their
testimony
source.
4

is admissible

as being obtained

from an

independent

Where they would have come forward, their testimony is

Joined by Justice Brennan.
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admissible under the inevitable discovery rule.

Attempting to

incorporate the considerations of these two doctrines into the corelative doctrine of attenuation bastardizes that doctrine.

As

Justice Marshall notes, the Supreme Court is engaged in "a form of
judicial 'double counting.'"
This
proximity

prong

Court
of

435 U.S. at 287.

should
the

also

analysis

clarify
is

only

that

the

relevant

temporal

insofar

something occurs in that time period to dissipate the taint.

as

With

respect to the Ceccolini case, the time that elapsed after the
illegal search "is of no more relevance than would be a similar
time period between the discovery of an object during an illegal
search and its later introduction into evidence at trial."

435

U.S. at 289. Thus, in the confession context (see Brown) , the time
after an illegal arrest may be relevant to the extent an accused
has an opportunity to consult with counsel and engage in detached
reflection, free from the coercive pressures of the situation, on
whether to give a statement.

Where, as here, the critical fact is

what is discovered in the course of the illegal seizure, no amount
of time will make a difference.

The bad traffic stop would taint

Mr. Ricks testimony at trial just as much if trial were held today
as it would at any earlier trial date.

As Judge Moffat noted:

If what you were to tell me now is that because of the
passage of time, something that was discovered that night
in the truck which is incriminating could no[w] be
introduced, I would say no. If the stop was bad, the
stop was bad and everything that flowed from it was bad.
. . . I think that something that's bad today is going
to be bad 50 years from today, to be used for the same
purpose that it's bad for today, you can't resurrect it
just by letting time go.
24

R. 159-60.
Under article I, section 14, this Court should reject
Ceccolini and hold that the same attenuation analysis is applicable
to both physical evidence and verbal evidence.

Additionally, this

Court should clarify that the passage of time is only relevant
insofar as something occurs in that time to dissipate the taint.

REASONS SUPPORTING ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED DECISION
This case raises novel issues concerning the suppression
of live witness testimony.
Ceccolini,

and

that

case

Utah has little case law addressing
law only

addresses

it

tangentially.

Finally, Mr. McGrath's state constitutional claims are novel and
should be addressed in a published opinion.

CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons, Mr. McGrath's

conviction

should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

</tt

day of August, 1995.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER

V.

DALE MCGRATH

Case No. 931901789FS
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

Defendant
The defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence came on
regularly for hearing on the 15th day of March 1994. The Court has
read the defendant's written motion filed 11 January 1994, listened
to the testimony of Detective James Glover, Marjorie McGrath and
David Ricks, and considered the arguments of counsel regarding this
motion. The Court also recalled and noted evidence from a similar
motion pertaining to Case No. 931900519FS, which motion was heard
by this Court on 9 June 1993. Based upon the foregoing, the Court
enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. During the early morning hours of 22 March, 1993, two
different convenience stores were robbed about 2 hours apart by a
lone gunman, who escaped from both the stores on foot. The clerkvictim at the second of the two stores saw a full-size, older model
white pickup drive by the store about sixty to ninety seconds after
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the robber left, and gave this information to responding police
officers a few minutes later. No suspects or evidence relating to
the robberies were discovered directly outside either store that
night.
2.

About one hour and thirty-five minutes after the

second robbery, Sergeant Jack Dwyer saw a white 1985 Ford pickup
going south on Highland Drive at about 3 900 South. Because he had
heard about a white older model pickup being connected with the 2
robberies, Dwyer followed the pickup, noted that two white males
were in the cab, and that the license plate was 587FUH.
3•

Dwyer then stopped the truck and discovered or

elicited certain incriminating evidence or statements, all of which
were ordered suppressed on 9 June 1993.
4.

Dwyer discovered the identities of Dale McGrath and

David Ricks after he stopped the truck.
5.

Dwyer gave the truck

Detective James Glover.
registered

license plate number to

Glover determined that this truck was

to Dale McGrath.

He contacted McGrath's mother,

Marjorie, at the address given on the truck registration, and gave
her a subpoena to testify at the hearing on 15 March 1994..
6.

Marjorie McGrath testified at the hearing that her

son Dale had left the residence with David Ricks on the night of 21
March 1993 in her son's white 1985 Ford pickup.

She said that

sometime after 22 March 1993, her son had told her that he was
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with Ricks and was driving the truck on the night of the robberies;
The defendant told Mrs. McGrath, as he was leaving, that he was
driving Ricks around trying to find him a place to stay that night.
7.

David Ricks testified

that he had

robbed two

convenience stores in Salt Lake County during the early morning
hours of 22 March 1993.
8.

Ricks said that he used a disguise, and a gun

provided by McGrath, to perform the robberies, while McGrath drove
the getaway truck.

Ricks claimed that McGrath shared in the

robberies' proceeds and that McGrath proposed the second robbery
after they mutually determined that the first one had not netted
enough.
9.

Ricks further testified that in late April or early

May of 1993, McGrath called him at the Salt Lake County Jail asking
that Ricks take responsibility for the two robberies and promising
that McGrath would make it up to him; that McGrath could get an
apartment with Ricks when Ricks got out of jail.
10.

Ricks also testified that he was continuously in

custody between his arrest on 22 March 1993, and his sentencing
date on 11 November 1993. While in custody, Ricks was interviewed
by

police

officeres

both

on

23

March

1993

and

again

in

approximately September, 1993. During the 23 March 1993 interview,
Ricks confessed to the robberies and implicated McGrath as a
knowing party to the robberies.

The September interview was
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the result of a visit to the jail by Detective Glover, who was
advised by Ricks' attorney that Ricks would make a statement and
testify against McGrath. During that interview, Ricks agreed once
again to testify against McGrath.

Ricks hoped that his co-

operation and his testimony against McGrath would influence the
Court to sentence him to probation.

He was, in fact, placed on

probation.
11.

On 10 September 1993, Detective Glover received a

telephone call from the defendant, Dale McGrath.

During this

telephone call, McGrath said that he had received only $10.00 from
Ricks on the morning of the robberies and that he therefore wanted
the remainder of the money taken from him on 22 March 1993 returned
to him. McGrath never stated to Det. Glover that the money was the
proceeds of a robbery.
12 . The stop of the pickup truck by Sergeant Dwyer on 22
March 1993 (paragraph 3 supra) was ruled by this Court to have been
made without an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the truck
had some connection with a crime of which Dwyer was aware. All the
money and weapons recovered from the defendant as a result of this
stop, as well as any statements made by the defendant to police
officers after his arrest and until his release from jail, were
suppressed.
13.

After this Court suppressed the evidence noted

above, the case against the defendant was dismissed on 11 June
1993.

It was refiled on 24 September 1993.
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14. David Ricks, the co-defendant in the original case,
plead guilty on 22 April 1993 to Count I as charged (Aggravated
Robbery, a first degree felony) and Count II was dismissed.

He

testified at the preliminary hearing of the refiled charges on 18
November 1993.
Based upon the findings listed above, the Court makes the
following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Although Sergeant Dwyer's stop of the white pickup on
22 March

1993 was without probable cause or reasonable and

articulable suspicion of criminal activity, only that evidence
which flows directly from the stop should be suppressed.

The

prayer of the defendant in his 23 April 1993 motion was granted
fully.
2.

Police

officers

or

agencies

may

continue

investigating a crime after a court suppresses certain evidence of
the initial investigation.

Evidence arising from that subsequent

investigative effort is not necessarily tainted merely because
police

officers

investigation.

are

aware

of

the

fruits

of

their

earlier

This is especially so when the State can show, as

it does in this case, that the new evidence is either unconnected
to, or extremely attenuated from the suppressed evidence.
3. After the 11 June 1993 dismissal, the State re-opened
the investigation into this matter. Sometime prior to 24 September

C00G0
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1993, Ricks agreed to testify about his and defendant's
activities on the morning of 22 March 1993, and he did in fact
testify regarding those matters at the preliminary hearing on 18
November 1993. His voluntary testimony in November was purged of
any taint associated with the illegal stop of defendant's truck in
March.

This purging was effected by both the passage of time and

Ricks' voluntary confession and statements.
4.

Statements made by the defendant to police officers

after his release from jail in March of 1993 are not fruit of the
poisonous tree. These statements were initiated by the defendant,
were over the telephone, and concerned ownership of some U.S.
currency recovered from the defendant's pockets on the morning of
22 March 1993.

Defendant's statement that only $10.00 of the

currency was the proceeds of a robbery was not the result of police
questioning.
5. The testimony of Marjorie McGrath regarding her son's
activities on the evening of 21 March 1993 is not fruit of the
poisonous tree, since her observations in this regard were made
before, and entirely independent of, the illegal stop several hours
later. Her conversations with her son regarding his involvement in
the robberies is free of any police action and occurred outside and
away from the jail. It is therefore untainted by the illegal stop.
6.

There is no evidence that this Court's 9 June 1993

order, suppressing evidence obtained as the result of the stop of
defendant's truck on the morning of 22 March 1993, has been or will
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be violated during the presentation of the State's evidence in this
case.
Based upon these facts and conclusions, the defendant's
11 January 1994 Motion to Suppress shall be, and hereby is denied.

Dated this

day of June, 1994
BY THE COURT

Approved as to form:

7K.fc<->

James Cope

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this

1

day of June, 1994.

im v l - (Wl
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ADDENDUM B
Excerpts from Mr. Ricks' criminal cases.
Case 931900518
plea affidavit
j udgement
Case 931900240
information
minute entry dismissal
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTR
ISTRICT

Ofe^uiy Clerk

STATE OF UTAH

THfi STATE OF UTAH,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL AND ORDER

v.
Criminal No. Cfa [c(O05\R

FS

Defendant.

COMES NOW, ifaxJrJ /Jn^i-k^/

Ackr

, the defendant in t h i s

case and hereby acknowledges and c e r t i f i e s the following:
I have entered a plea of ( g u i l t y ) (no contest) to the
f o l l o w i n g crime(s):

CRIME & STATUTORY

DEGREE

PUNISHMENT

(Min/max) and/or

PROVISION

Miniraium Mandatory

A./4r; /fhbkry

isLabps*

£~fc /<{~ &</> /*.»*.*

I have received a copy of the (charge) (information)
against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature and elements
of the offense(s) for which I am pleading (guilty) (no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as
follows:

^yy

oytdAsU

<?H

/99~h

7^L

QL/L^J^

*<

*

fa.ffy

My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am
criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s)

charged are as follows: ^

^^Ark

*^

/?9~*> >*%-

n/^-^U

*< *

«^~

I am entering ^Ts/Jraese plea(s) voluntarily and with
knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an

attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the court at no cost to me.

I recognize that a

condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as
determined by the court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so
appointed for me.

-2 -

2.

lX(have not)) (have) waived my right to counsel.

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons:

3.

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this

statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges, my
rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of my plea
of guilty.
4.

If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney

is >t(////i/ $> P L ? ^ ^ - - ^

/ and I have had an opportunity to

discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my guilty
plea with my attorney.
5.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.

6.

I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right

to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them
cross-examined by my attorney.

I also know that I have the right to

compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense to testify in
court upon my behalf.
7.

I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf

but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to testify or
give evidence

against myself and no adverse inferences will be

drawn against me if I do not testify.

-3 -

8.

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me

I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for
trial.

At the trial the state of Utah will have the burden of

proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

If

the trial -is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous.
9.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would have
the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of
Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I
could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would
be paid by the state.
10.

I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for

each offense to which I plead (d^iljtyj (no contest).

I know that by

pleading /fguilt^j) (no contest) to an offense that carries a minimum
mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself to serving a
minimum mandatory sentence for that offense.

I know that the

sentences may be consecutive and may be for a prison term, fine, or
both.

I know that in addition to a fine a twenty-five percent (25%)

surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated §63-63a-4, will be
imposed.

I also know that I may be ordered by the court to make

restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes.
11.

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive

periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to more
than one charge.

I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or

awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been

-4 -

convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
12.

I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) (no

contest) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set out
in the preceding paragraphs.

I also know that by entering such

plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the
conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s)
is/are entered.
13.

My plea(s) of.-{guiltyj^ (no contest) (is) (is not) the

result of a plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting
attorney.

The promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain,

if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this
affidavit.
14.

I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my

plea(s) of/jguilty)) (no contest) I must do so by filing a motion
within thirty (30) days after entry of my plea.
15.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or

recommendation of probation or suspended

sentence, including a

reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the
judge.

I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what

they believe the court may do are also not binding on the court.
16.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any

kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises

-5 -

except those contained herein and in the attached plea agreement,
have been made to me.
17.

I have read this statement or I have had it read to me

by my attorney, and I understand its provisions.

I know that I am

free to change or delete anything contained in this statement.

I do

not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are
correct.
18.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my

19.

I am

attorney.

through the _jlj~h

/*?

years of age;

I have attended school

grade and I can read and understand the English

language or an interpreter has been provided to me.

I was not under

the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which would
impair my judgment when the decision .was made to enter the plea(s).
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or
intoxicants which impair my judgment.
20.

I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind,

mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this

^7

day of

£^J2

j^xJ\VZJ^
% EFENDANT

-6 -

, 19 ?-%.

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for^j,^

^^j-U^y^c^

the defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement
or that I have read it to him/her and I have discussed it with
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent•

To the best of

my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the
elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's
criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the
other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

ATTORNEY FOR 0EPENDANT/BAR NUMBER
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in
the case agains&fc^// Ati^U*^-^/

Js\cH defendant.

I have reviewed

this statement of the defendant and find that the declarations,
including the elements of the offense of the charges(s) and the
factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense are true and correct.

No improper

inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been
offered defendant.

The plea negotiations are fully contained in the

statement and in the attached plea agreement or as supplemented on

-7 -

record before the court.

There is reasonable cause to believe that

the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the
offenses(s) for which the plea(s) is/are ej>fc€^ed an#?accep£aj*cr9 of
the plea(s) would serve the public int*

ATTORNEY/BAR"NUMBER

Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement
and the certification of the defendant and counsel, the court
witnesses the signatures and finds the defendant's plea oiMTguilty)
(no contest) is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered
that the defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s)
set forth in the statement be accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT this

<p

Q.

day of

/

DGE HS&3"{ \
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I
J
IN T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL UISIHICT COURT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

.

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
Case No. 931900518
Count No. 1
Honorable RICHARD H MOFFAT
MARCY THORNE
Clfirk
Reporter _ VIDEO 11:35
ANN CARDON
Bailiff
NOVEMBER 19, 1993
Date

vs.

RICKS, DAVID ANTHONY

Defendant.

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; 0 plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of
AGG ROBBERY
, a felony
of the 1ST degree, • a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by K BROWN
and the State being represented by J COPE
, is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D
D
D
XO
D
Xfr
D

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
, ^ <^ —. > L~>f\
c
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
^* ^ *
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
\ \^ 2 £ ) - ^ 2 >
€5> • ^ S > O L < o ^
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $1Q,QQQ PLUS 85% SURCHARGE
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to

D such sentence is to run concurrently with
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s)

are hereby dismissed.

•
XfiO Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
3 YEAR$
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 9ftnfined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
• Commitment shall issue
QATPnthi.

19THriaynf

NOVEMB^

1 (

^3

/§/fjg%£s£

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney
/

0--2_££

(White—Court)

(Green—Judge)

Page
(Yellow—J*il/Pnson/AP&P)

(PinK—Defense)

(GoidenmH—e.—.

1

., 2
of

Judgment/State v.

RICKS, DAVID ANTHONY

,CR

931900

&1n8nnrahio

RICHARD H MOFFAT

CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
D Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole.
D Serve
.
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing
D Pay a fine in the amount of $
D at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole; or D at the rate of
.
%% Pay restitution in the amount of $
; or Kl in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of
; or • at a rate to be determined by
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
a Enter, participate in, and complete any
program, counseling, or treatment as
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Enter, participate in, and complete the
program at
D Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or D vocational training a as directed by the
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with
D Participate in and complete any
training a as directed by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; or • with
XX Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs.
)£X Submit to drug testing.
XX Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs.
)tX Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally.
XX Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances.
XX Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
XX Submit to testing for alcohol use.
D Take antabuse • as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment.
D Maintain full-time employment.
XX Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling.
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling.
• Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to
under the Interstate Compact as approved
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Complete
hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole.
D Complete
hours of community service restitution in lieu of
days in jail.
XX Defendant is to commit no crimes.
Erfendant is ordered to appear
for a review of this sentence,
D Defendant
appea before this Court on
U DEFENDANT TO OBTAIN 6ED
H DEFENDANT TO UNDERGO ANY EVALUATION, TREATMENT OR COUNSELING AS RECOMMENDED
H DEFENDANT TO TAKE MEDICATION AS RECOMMENDED
H DEFENDANT TO APPEAR WHEN SUBPOENA AND TESTIFY TRUTHFULLY
H DEFENDANT TO BE RELEASED FROM JAIL ON NOVEMBER 2 2 , 1993 TO
H DEFENDANT TO PAY ALL OUTSTANDING FINES
DATED this

Page

2

of

19TH

2

d a y of

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
ROGER S. BLAYLOCK, Bar No. 0367
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street, S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Phone: (801) 468-3422

•w\

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by: R. BLAYLOCK
Assigned to: TBA

Plaintiff,
BAIL

$5,000 EACH

v.
INFORMATION
A-BRIAN M. BURTON
3-16-73,
OTN
B-DAVID ANTHONY RICKS
6-6-73,
aka DAVID ANTHONY PRESCOTT
OTN

Criminal No.

Defendant(s).

931 QCnH-IZ. FS
The undersigned, DETECTIVE C. CHILTON - WEST VALLEY CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT, under oath states on information and belief that
the defendant(s) committed the crime(s) of:
COUNT I
BURGLARY, a Second Degree Felony, at 3881 West Crown Avenue, #B,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about October
12, 1992, through October 29, 1992, in violation of Title
76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendants, BRIAN M. BURTON and
DAVID ANTHONY RICKS, parties to the offense, entered or
remained unlawfully in the dwelling of Albert F. Humphrey
with the intent to commit a theft;
COUNT II
THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 3881 West Crown Avenue, #B, in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about October 12,
1992, through October 29, 1992, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendants, BRIAN M. BURTON and
DAVID ANTHONY RICKS, parties to the offense, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of
Albert F. Humphrey with the purpose to deprive the owner
thereof, and that the value of said property exceeded
$1,000;

INFORMATION
STATE v. BRIAN M. BURTON
DAVID ANTHONY RICKS
County Attorney #93-3-00039
Page 2
COUNT III
THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 3381 South Crown Avenue, #B, in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about October 12,
1992, through October 29, 1992, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, DAVID ANTHONY RICKS, a
party to the offense, obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the firearm of Albert F. Humphrey with the
purpose to deprive the owner thereof;
COUNT IV
THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 3881 West Crown Avenue, #B, in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about October 12,
1992, through October 29, 1992, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, BRIAN M. BURTON, a party
to the offense, obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over the firearm of Albert F. Humphrey with the
purpose to deprive the owner thereof.
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Albert F. Humphrey
Deputy Stidham
• Deputy S. Winters
Agent
Spence Nielsen
Detective A. Casanova
Steven Prescott
Diane
Prescott
Chad D. Goodrich
Alan Boyd Wall
Denzil Cummins
Justin L. Dahlquist
Frank E. Reedy
Detective M, Wells
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Affiant, a West Valley City Police Officer, bases this
Information upon the statements of Albert F. Humphrey in the report
of Jerry Randall, number 92-19517, that when he returned to his
apartment at 3881 West Crown Avenue, on October 29, 1992, after
being gone since October 12, 1992, he found the sliding glass door
had been opened and stereo equipment, a VCR/Television, a VCR,
telephones, blank checks, beer, clothes, and firearms, valued at
over $6,000, were taken without his permission.

(Continued on Page 3)

I T A T C ^ S B R I A N M7 BURTON
R
DAVID ANTHONY RICKS

County Attorney #93-3-00039
Page 3
Affiant also bases this Information upon the admissions of
the defendants, Brian Burton and David Ricks, that they entered the
residence and took the property, including a .357 pistol which Ricks
took and then sold to a person who lived in the Crown Apartments,
and a .22 rifle which Burton took and kept.

d.&tu-u^

Affiant

L tQ before
ahUBTy, 1993.

A \
\

\SJWARDX.

Authorized for presentment and
filing:
DAVID E

«ALTwuy

OM, Salt Lake County Attorney
., Deputy

JantTarY/7, 1993
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" E D DISTRICT COURT
TWrd Judicial District

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE

Plaintiff,

Date:

MAY 3, 1993

vs.

Case No:

931900240

DAVID ANTHONY RICKS,

Judge:

KENNETH RIGTRUP

Defendant.

Clerk:

CUG

FS

Reporter: CECILEE WILSON

HEARING
This case is before the court for DISPOSITION HEARING on the
charges of
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

BURGLARY
THEFT
THEFT
THEFT
Appearing for the State is GREG WARNER.

present.

(Second
(Second
(Second
(Second

Degree
Degree
Degree
Degree

Felony)
Felony)
Felony)
Felony)

The defendant is

Appearing as counsel for the defendant is LYNN R. BROWN.

On state's motion court orders case dismissed as part of a plea
bargain.

